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Teacher quality is widely believed to be important for education, despite little ev-
idence that teachers’ credentials matter for student achievement. To accurately
measure variation in achievement due to teachers’ characteristics–both observ-
able and unobservable–it is essential to identify teacher ﬁxed eﬀects. Unlike
previous studies, I use panel data to estimate teacher ﬁxed eﬀects while control-
ling for ﬁxed student characteristics and classroom speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s . Iﬁnd large
and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences among teachers: a one standard deviation
increase in teacher quality raises reading and math test scores by approximately
.20 and .24 standard deviations, respectively, on a nationally standardized scale.
In addition, teaching experience has statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on
reading test scores, controlling for ﬁxed teacher quality.
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School administrators, parents, and students themselves widely support the notion that
teacher quality is vital to student achievement, despite the lack of evidence linking achieve-
ment to observable teacher characteristics. Studies that estimate the relation between
achievement and teachers’ characteristics, including their credentials, have produced little
consistent evidence that students perform better when their teachers have more ‘desirable’
characteristics. This is all the more puzzling because of the potential upward bias in such
estimates–teachers with better credentials may be more likely to teach in aﬄuent districts
with high performing students.1
This has led many observers to conclude that, while teacher quality may be important,
variation in teacher quality is driven by characteristics that are diﬃcult or impossible to
measure. Therefore, researchers have come to focus on using matched student-teacher data
to separate student achievement into a series of “ﬁxed eﬀects,” and assigning importance
to individuals, teachers, schools, and so on. Researchers who have sought to explain wage
determination have followed a similar empirical path; they try to separate industry, occupa-
tion, establishment, and individual eﬀects using employee-employer matched data (Abowd
and Kramarz, 1999). Despite agreement that the identiﬁcation of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects is a
productive path, this exercise has remained incomplete because of a lack of adequate data.
Credible identiﬁcation of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects requires panel data where students and teachers
1Teachers with better credentials, such as experience or selectivity of undergraduate institution, tend to
gravitate towards districts with higher salaries (Figlio, 1997).
1are observed in multiple years, and this type of data is not readily available to researchers.2
A small number of studies have found signiﬁcant variation in test scores across classrooms
within particular schools, even after controlling for student characteristics.3 In other words,
dummy variables identifying students’ classrooms seem to be important explanatory variables
in regressions of student test scores. Although researchers have associated the signiﬁcance of
classroom dummy variables with variation in teacher quality, other classroom speciﬁcf a c t o r s
may also be driving diﬀerences among classroom achievement levels. In these studies, teacher
eﬀects cannot be separated from other classroom eﬀects because teachers are only observed
in one classroom.
In order to provide more accurate estimates of how much teachers aﬀect the achievement
of their students, I obtained panel data covering over a decade of student test scores and
teacher assignment in two contiguous school districts. The observation of teachers with
multiple classrooms allows me to measure teacher ﬁxed eﬀects while including direct controls
for a number of classroom speciﬁc factors that may systematically inﬂuence student test
score performance, such as peer achievement and class size. Observation of students’ test
scores in multiple years allows for the inclusion of student ﬁxed eﬀects, so that variation in
student ﬁxed characteristics, such as cognitive ability, does not drive estimated diﬀerences
in student performance across teachers. In addition, because teachers’ experience levels
change naturally, the eﬀect of experience on student performance is identiﬁed from variation
within teachers. This is, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst study of teacher quality that employs
2However, this data is widely collected by both local and state education agencies, and could be used
by these institutions for purposes of evaluation. Though this has seldom been done in practice, one promi-
nent example is the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System, where districts, schools, and teachers are
compared based on test score gains averaged over a number of years.
3Hanushek (1971), Murnane (1975), and Armor et al. (1976).
2these methods.
Estimates of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects from linear regressions of test scores consistently indi-
cate that there are large diﬀerences in quality among teachers in this data. A one standard
deviation increase in teacher quality raises test scores by approximately .20 standard devia-
tions in reading and .24 standard deviations in math on nationally standardized distributions
of achievement. I ﬁnd that teaching experience signiﬁcantly raises student test scores in
reading subject areas. Reading test scores diﬀer by approximately .20 standard deviations
on average between beginning teachers and teachers with ten or more years of experience.
Moreover, estimated returns to experience are quite diﬀerent if teacher ﬁxed eﬀects are
omitted from my analysis. This suggests that using variation across teachers to identify
experience eﬀects may give biased results due to correlation between teacher ﬁxed eﬀects
and teaching experience.
Policymakers have demonstrated their faith in the importance of teachers by greatly in-
creasing funding for programs that aim to improve teacher quality in low performing schools.4
However, the vast majority of these initiatives focus on rewarding teachers who possess cre-
dentials that have not been concretely linked to student performance (e.g. certiﬁcation,
schooling, teacher exam scores). My results support the idea that raising teacher quality
is an important way to improve achievement, but suggest that policies may beneﬁtf r o m
shifting focus from credentials to performance-based indicators of teacher quality.
This paper is organized as follows: in section two, I provide an overview of previous
4The most recent example is the ‘No Child Left Behind Act,’ which appropriated over $4 billion for
training and recruitment of teachers in 2002. This is in addition to various other federal and state initiatives
targeting teachers, such as forgiving student loans, easing qualiﬁcations for home mortgages, and waiving
tuition for teachers’ children who enroll in state universities.
3literature on the importance of teachers; in section three, I describe the data I collected for
this study; in section four, I present my empirical ﬁndings; section ﬁve concludes.
2 Related Literature
The overwhelming majority of work on teacher quality has examined the relation between
teacher characteristics and objective measures of student performance (usually standardized
test scores), at the individual, school, or district level. Hanushek (1986) provides an ac-
counting of the results of 147 such studies. With regard to teacher education and teacher
experience, he ﬁnds, “In a majority of cases, the estimated coeﬃcients are statistically in-
signiﬁcant. Forgetting about statistical signiﬁcance and just looking at estimated signs does
not make much of a case for the importance of these factors either.” The lack of any con-
sistent pattern in these results is striking, considering the fact that most schools pay more
for teachers with graduate degrees or more experience, suggesting a belief on their part that
these factors indicate higher teacher quality. It is even more surprising if one believes that
non-random assignment of teachers to schools and/or classrooms could lead to a positive
bias in any estimated relation between teachers’ credentials and student achievement.
However, these ﬁndings should not be taken as strong evidence that teachers do not mat-
ter; only that teacher quality may be unrelated to these observable characteristics. A more
direct method to address whether teachers matter is to test whether there are statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in students’ achievement levels caused by persistent diﬀerences among
their teachers–in other words, to identify teacher ﬁxed eﬀects. Yet only a small number of
studies have even approached the problem in this way because the data required to do so is
4rarely available to researchers.5
Hanushek (1971) was the ﬁrst to use ﬁxed eﬀects in an analysis of student achievement.
He demonstrated that classroom dummy variables have signiﬁcant explanatory power in
regressions of students’ test scores–conditional on past achievement–and took this as an
indication that teacher eﬀects are important. Classroom dummy variables were similarly
found to be signiﬁcant predictors of test scores in studies by Murnane (1975) and Armor
et al. (1976).6 In addition, both studies found that principals’ opinions of teachers had
predictive power for student achievement, providing some evidence that teacher quality was
driving a signiﬁcant portion of the variation in achievement across classrooms. Teachers
were only observed with one classroom in all three studies, so teacher eﬀects could not be
directly separated from classroom eﬀects in their analyses.
Hanushek (1992) again found signiﬁcant diﬀerences among classrooms using data on
Black children from the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment.7 More importantly, some
teachers were observed with multiple classrooms, allowing for a direct test of whether teach-
ers, as opposed to other classroom factors, were driving diﬀerences in achievement across
classrooms. Hanushek’s strategy was to test the restriction of equal eﬀects across class-
rooms with the same teacher. He found the restriction could be rejected, but only due to
5Rivkin et al. (2001) take a more subtle approach to estimating teacher quality and deserve mention.
Though they cannot match students with their actual teachers, they model a link between teacher turnover
and teacher quality that occurs through changes in the variance of test score gains across cohorts. They use
this model to construct a lower bound estimate of the contribution of teacher quality to student test scores
using data from the Texas Schools Project. They ﬁnd a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality
raises test scores by .11 standard deviations.
6All three studies also examined a multitude of teacher characteristics, including education and experience,
but none were consistently found to have signiﬁcant predictive power for student test scores. Hanushek found
that performance on a Quick-Word Test did correlate well with student achievement, which he interprets as
proxying for teacher IQ or ability. Murnane found that children performed better with experienced teachers,
with male teachers, and also with teachers of the same race.
7He again found little evidence that teacher characteristics matter. It is also worth noting that teacher
quality was not the main focus of this paper.
5a small number of teachers with widely diﬀerent measured eﬀects across years. He there-
fore concluded “the general stability of teacher impacts” provided “additional support for a
teacher skill interpretation of diﬀerences in classroom performance.” However, even if there
were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬀects for classes with the same teacher, this may reﬂect the
importance of other classroom factors, and not the insigniﬁcance of teachers.
T h em o s tc r e d i b l ew a yt oi d e n t i f yt e a c h e re ﬀects is to regress test scores on teacher
dummy variables when teachers are observed with many classrooms (netting out idiosyncratic
variation in classroom performance) and controlling for variation in student characteristics
and other classroom speciﬁc variables. These options were not possible in previous studies
because of data limitations. The data I collected for this study links teachers with their
students for a period of up to twelve years, and contains up to ﬁve years of annual test scores
for all elementary students in a number of schools. I can thus credibly identify teacher ﬁxed
eﬀects, and measure the importance of teachers by the magnitude of the diﬀerence between
high and low quality teachers in my data.
3T h e D a t a
I obtained data on elementary school students and teachers in two contiguous districts from
a single county in New Jersey. I will refer to them as districts ‘A’ and ‘B’.8 Both have
multiple elementary schools serving each grade, and, within each school, there are two to
seven teachers per grade in any particular year. Elementary school populations in these
districts grew considerably over this time period, but the racial composition of the students
8For reasons of conﬁdentiality, I refrain from giving any information that could be used to identify these
districts.
6was stable.9 The average socioeconomic status of residents in these school districts is above
the state median, but considerably below the most aﬄuent districts.10 In the proportion of
students eligible for free/reduced price lunch, these districts fell near the 33rd percentile in
the state during the 2000-2001 school year. Spending per pupil that year was slightly above
the state average in district A, and slightly below average in district B.
I focus on elementary education for four primary reasons. First, elementary students in
these districts are tested in the spring of every year using nationally standardized exams;
older students are tested less frequently and use state-based examinations. Second, elemen-
tary students remain with a single teacher for most of the school day and receive reading and
math instruction from this teacher. I can therefore be conﬁdent that a student’s current
teacher is the person from whom they have received almost all instruction since the last time
they were tested. Third, school administrators in these districts claim that, unlike higher
grades, elementary school students are not tracked by ability or achievement. In the ap-
pendix, I conﬁrm this by showing that students are not systematically grouped by previous
achievement levels or by their previous classroom.11 Fourth, it is very likely that basic skills
test scores are related to important economic outcomes, and that basic skills constitute a
large part of what elementary school students learn.12
9Enrollment in both districts grew by over 40% during the period for which I have data. Students in
these districts are predominantly White (between 70-80% during this time period), with the remainder made
up of relatively equal populations of Black, Hispanic, and Asian students.
10School districts in New Jersey are placed into District Factor Groups based on the average socio-economic
status of their residents, using a composite index of indicators from the most recent U.S. decennial census.
11That is, I demonstrate that dummy variables for students’ current classrooms do not have predictive
power for students’ previous test scores. I also show that actual classroom assignment produces similar
mixing of classmates from year to year as one would expect from random assignment.
12Concerns over ‘teaching to the test’ are important to the extent that teachers can raise elementary
students’ basic skills test scores without actually teaching them basic skills. I regard this as highly unlikely.
However, teachers who focus on basic skills may do so at the expense of other valuable skills. I have no way
of discerning whether or not this occurs in my data.
7The test score data I collected spans the 1989-1990 through 2000-2001 school years.13
Test scores come from nationally standardized basic skills reading and math tests, and up to
four subject area tests were given to students in a given year: Reading Vocabulary, Reading
Comprehension, Math Computation and Math Concepts.14 Data collected from District
A comes from students in 1st through 5th grade, and in District B from 2nd through 6th
grade. Students’ scores are reported on a Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) scale. NCE scores
range from 1 to 99 (with a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 21) and are standardized
by grade level.15 Test makers assert that each NCE point represents an equal increase in
test performance, allowing scores to be added, subtracted, or averaged in a more meaningful
way than national percentiles. Using national percentiles in my analysis does not noticeably
alter the results. Figure 1 shows the distribution of NCE scores in these districts, along
with the nationally standardized distribution.16 Students in these districts score 10-15 NCE
points higher on average than the nationwide mean in all subjects. The variance in test score
performance within these districts is considerable, though less than the national distribution,
and relatively few students score below 30 NCE points.17
13District B data does not include the 2000-2001 school year.
14Both districts administered the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) at the start of these time
period, but switched at some point–District A to the TerraNova CTBS (a revised version of CTBS) and
District B to the Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT). The subtest names are identical across all of these
tests, and it is therefore unlikely that the changes reﬂect a radical shift in the type of material tested or
taught to students.
15Using scores that are standardized at a particular grade level may be problematic if the distribution of
student achievement changes as students grow older. For example, if a change of one NCE point at the 6th
grade level represents a much smaller diﬀerence in learning than one NCE point at the 1st grade level, then
we might want to regard a given amount of variation in 1st grade student performance as representing larger
variation in teacher quality than the same variation among 6th graders. I do not attempt to reconcile this
possibility in my analysis.
16I pool the districts because their distributions of scores are quite similar. Not all 99 scores are possible
on every test, so I group NCE scores from 1-9, 10-19, and so on. I simulate the national distribution by
taking 20,000 draws from a normal distribution with mean 50 and standard deviation 21, and then grouping
t h e mi nt h es a m em a n n e r .
17A small but non-trivial percentage (about 3-6%) of scores in each district are at the maximum possible
for the test taken, raising the possibility that censoring of ‘true’ achievement might aﬀect the results of my
8I also gathered information on students’ gender, ethnicity, special education classiﬁcation
and ESL enrollment, as well as school, grade, and teacher identiﬁers. Teacher identiﬁers
are also matched with data on their highest degree earned, teaching experience, and year of
birth.18 As mentioned above, the usefulness of this dataset stems from the observation of
both pupils and teachers in multiple years. In both districts, the median student was tested
three times–almost one quarter of the students were tested once, and over one quarter were
tested ﬁve times. The median number of classrooms observed per teacher is six in district A
and three in district B. About 18% of teachers in district A and 26% of teachers in district
B are only observed with just one classroom of students, but 53% of teachers in district A
and 29% of teachers in district B are observed with more than ﬁve classrooms of students.
Analyzing the districts separately reveals no marked diﬀerences in results or conclusions,
and for simplicity I combine them in the results presented below. Because the number of
tests administered varies somewhat over grades and years, and because teacher quality may
vary by subject, I examine each subject area separately, and then consider to what extent
my results diﬀer across them.
analysis. I checked for this by performing the main part of my analysis with censored-normal regressions,
and the results were not qualitatively diﬀerent to those presented below. Also, enrolled students who are
absent on the day of the test, or change districts earl i e ri nt h ey e a r ,a r en o to b s e r v e di nt h et e s t i n gd a t a .
To see whether the probability of being tested was related to achievement, I use enrollment information
available in district B since the 1995-1996 school year. I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between students’
previous test scores and their probability of being tested in the following year, both in linear probability and
probit regressions.
18Information on teachers’ education and experience was not available for a small portion of teachers in
both districts, and for some teachers I only know their experience teaching in the district. However, for
teachers where data is not missing, the vast majority had no previous teaching experience when hired. In
any case, omitting teachers with incomplete data from my analysis does not have a noticeable eﬀect on the
results.
94 Empirical Results
(1) Aisgjt = αi + γXit + θj + f (Expjt)+ηCjt + πs + πg + πt + εisgjt
Consider equation 1, which provides a linear speciﬁcation of the test score of student
i in school s and grade g, with teacher j in year t. The test score (Aisgjt) is a function
of the student’s ﬁxed characteristics (αi), observable time-varying characteristics (Xit), a
teacher ﬁxed eﬀect (θj), teaching experience (Expjt), observable classroom characteristics
(Cjt), factors varying across schools, grades, and years (πs,πg,πt), and all other factors that
aﬀect test scores (εisgjt), including measurement error.19 This model restricts eﬀects to be
independent across ages, and assumes no correlation between current inputs and future test
scores–zero persistence–except for inputs that span across years, like αi.20
Two issues of collinearity create diﬃculties in the estimation of equation 1. Experience
and year are collinear within teachers (except for a few who leave and return) and grade and
year are collinear within students (except for a few who repeat grades).21 Because of these
issues, consistent estimation of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects and experience eﬀects can be achieved
only under some identifying assumptions.
The ﬁrst assumption I make is that additional experience does not aﬀect student test
scores after a certain point (f0 =0if Expjt > Exp). Under this assumption, year eﬀects
19Subscripts for subject area are not included for simplicity. Experience is deﬁned as number of years
taught prior to the current year, so that new teachers are considered to have zero experience.
20Persistence of eﬀects will bias my estimates of teacher ﬁxed eﬀe c t si ft h eq u a l i t yo fc u r r e n ti n p u t sa n d
past inputs are correlated, conditional on the other control variables. Because classroom assignment appears
similar to random assignment in these districts (see appendix), this source of bias is likely to be unimportant.
A simple way to incorporate persistence, used in a number of other studies, is to model test score gains, as
opposed to levels. However, this type of model restricts changes in test scores to be perfectly persistent over
time, which, if not true, would lead to the same type of bias. Also, test scores gains can be more volatile,
since the idiosyncratic factors that aﬀect test score levels will aﬀect gains to twice the extent (Kane and
Staiger, 2001).
21In these districts, I ﬁnd 9% of teachers had discontinuous careers, and less than 1% of students repeated
grades.
10can be separately identiﬁed from students whose teachers have experience above the cutoﬀ
(Exp). This restriction is supported by previous research, which suggests that the marginal
eﬀect of experience declines quickly, and any gains from experience are made in the ﬁrst few
years of teaching (Rivkin et al., 2001). Moreover, the plausibility of this assumption can
be examined by viewing the estimated marginal experience eﬀects at Exp.22 My second
assumption is that grade eﬀects are zero and can therefore be omitted from the model.
This assumption is supported by the fact that test scores are normalized by grade level.23
Equation 2 incorporates these two identifying assumptions and generalizes the model by
including school-year eﬀects (πst).24




DExpjt>Exp + ηCjt + πst + εisjt
Table 1 shows results for regressions where f (Expjt) is a cubic and Exp equals ten years
of experience.25 The time-varying student controls (Xit) are dummy variables for being
retained or repeating a grade, and the classroom controls (Cjt) are class size, the average of
classmates’ test scores from the previous year, being in a split-level classroom, and being in
the lower half of a split level classroom.26 Because errors are heteroskedastic and possibly
22For example, if f (Expjt) is estimated as a quadratic, then f (Expjt)=aExpjt + bExpjt, and one can
test whether a +2 bExp =0 .
23Technically, consistent estimation of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects only requires that grade eﬀects be uncorrelated
with teacher assignment, but this is clearly not true–the majority of teachers in these districts do not switch
grade levels.
24DExpjt≤Exp is a dummy variable for having less than Exp years of experience.
25The cutoﬀ restriction is implemented by recoding experience as follows:
Expjt =
½
Expjt if Expjt ≤ Exp
Exp if Expjt > Exp
Results are similar with other cutoﬀ levels, but this speciﬁcation is preferred because teachers with more
than ten years of experience teach about half of the students in the school-year cells in my data. Results
are also similar with other polynomial speciﬁcations of f (Expjt), but while the cubic term appears to be
important in at least one subject area, quartic or higher order terms do not.
26Split-level classrooms refer to classes where students of adjacent grades are placed in the same classroom.
This arrangement was used in district B, albeit infrequently, to help balance class sizes.
11serially correlated within students over time, standard errors are clustered at the student
level.27
As one might expect, students perform lower than their own average in years when they
are subsequently held back–between .26 and .41 standard deviations on the nationally stan-
dardized scales. In the following year, when repeating a grade, students perform signiﬁcantly
lower than their average in the Math Computation subject area, but otherwise score similarly
to their average.28
I ﬁnd that classroom speciﬁc variables are not important predictors of test scores in these
districts. Students in split-level classrooms, both above and below the split, do not perform
signiﬁcantly diﬀerently than they do in regular classrooms. Class size has a statistically
insigniﬁcant eﬀect on student test scores in all four subject areas, and the signs of the point
estimates are split evenly between positive and negative values. In other regressions (not
shown), I check for non-linear eﬀects of class size by including its square and cube. I also
try interacting class size with a dummy for being Black or Hispanic, since Krueger (1999)
and Rivkin et al. (2001) ﬁnd that minorities may be more sensitive to class size eﬀects. I
do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of class size in any of these speciﬁcations.
The average past performance of students’ classmates also seems to have no discernible
eﬀect on test scores. In other speciﬁcations (not shown), I ﬁnd linear and non-linear trans-
formations of classmates’ previous achievement or classmates’ demographic characteristics
27Measurement error in test scores is heteroskedastic by construction. Since tests are geared toward
measuring achievement at a particular grade and time, e.g. spring of 3rd grade, the test is less accurate for
students who ﬁnd the test very diﬃcult or very easy.
28These estimates may reﬂect the inﬂuence of many factors associated with being held back or repeating
a grade. Students who are held back may have had diﬃculties stemming from problems at home, an illness,
etc. Likewise, when they repeat a grade, they may be getting more support from parents or may be working
harder in order not to fail again, in addition to seeing material for a second time.
12are also not signiﬁcant predictors of students’ own achievement.29 Though it is quite diﬃcult
to know how peer eﬀects operate ap r i o r i , there are many reasons to think that measures of
past achievement and observable characteristics would be good proxies for peer eﬀects.30 Us-
ing past achievement also helps avoid the reﬂection problem in estimating contemporaneous
peer inﬂuences (Manski 1993).
The insigniﬁcance of classroom characteristics in these regressions may be viewed as
somewhat surprising, given the recent literature on these issues and evidence from some
studies of teacher eﬀects (Hanushek 1972, Summers and Wolfe 1979). However, these
estimates should not be interpreted as causal, since I am not making an eﬀort to credibly
identify the eﬀects of these variables from exogenous variation; I am including them as
controls so that I can be certain that diﬀerences in teacher ﬁxed eﬀects are not driven by
diﬀerences in these factors.
The use of past achievement as a control variable forces me to drop a substantial fraction
of observations from my analysis–an entire grade and year–and does not help to explain
test scores. I therefore remove this control variable and present results on teacher ﬁxed
eﬀects and experience eﬀects from regressions of test scores that include a larger number of
students and teachers. Estimated eﬀects for the time-varying student controls and other
classroom factors are quite similar to those cited above, and are shown in table 2.31
The joint statistical signiﬁcance of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects in these regressions is measured
29In particular, I also tried including the variance of classmates’ test scores, and the number (or proportion)
of a students’ classmates who: 1) had previous scores one standard deviation above/below the mean, 2) were
classiﬁed students 3) were enrolled in ESL, 4) were held back or repeating a grade, 5) were female, 6) were
Black or Hispanic. I also tried various combinations and interactions of these factors.
30For instance, high achieving students may share knowledge with their classmates, low performing students
may disrupt instruction, dispersion of achievement may make teaching more diﬃcult, etc.
31The only notable diﬀerence is that, in Reading Comprehension, the negative eﬀect of being placed in
the lower half of a split-level classroom is now statistically signiﬁcant.
13by an F-test, and the F-statistics and their associated p-values are shown in Panel I of table
3. They indicate that teachers are highly signiﬁcant predictors of achievement in all four
subject areas, with p-values below .001. In order to be sure that outlying observations on
transient teachers do not drive these results, I repeat these tests using only teachers observed
in at least three years. P-values for this more selective test are lower in all subject areas.32
To express the magnitude of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects, I calculate the diﬀerence between the
median teacher and those at various percentiles of the ﬁxed eﬀect distribution.33 These
calculations are shown in Panel II of table 3. Diﬀerences between the 75th and 25th
percentile teachers in reading and math scores are about 5.5 and 6.5 NCE points, respectively,
or about .26 and .31 standard deviations on the national achievement distribution.34 If
teacher eﬀects are normally distributed, the estimates above imply that a one standard
deviation change in teacher quality would change student test scores by about .20 and .24
standard deviations in reading and math, respectively. Transient teachers do not drive these
results either; repeating these calculations using only teachers observed in at least three years
gives similar magnitudes.
The diﬀerence between high and low quality teachers is given in terms of nationally stan-
dardized exam scores and is thus easily interpretable. However, it is diﬃcult to know how the
distribution of teacher quality in these districts compares to the distribution of quality among
broader groups of teachers, for example, statewide or nationwide. Nevertheless, salaries,
geographic amenities, and other factors that aﬀect districts’ abilities to attract teachers vary
32P-values for tests on teacher eﬀects in the regressions that included classmates’ previous test scores are
all also below .001, both for all teachers and teachers observed at least three times.
33Though there are alternative ways of expressing variation in teacher quality, this method is simple and
transparent. It is quite similar to that used by Bertrand and Schoar (2001) to characterize the magnitude
of CEO ﬁxed eﬀects on ﬁrm outcomes.
34Comparing percentiles at diﬀerent parts of the distribution gives similar results.
14to a much greater degree at the state or national level. This suggests that variation in
quality within groups of teachers at broader geographical levels may be considerably larger,
and that my estimates of the importance of teachers may be conservative. The controls for
school-year eﬀects may also lead me to underestimate the magnitude of variation in teacher
quality, since any variation in average teacher quality across school-year cells is taken up by
these controls.35
To analyze experience eﬀects, I plot point estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals for the
function f (Expjt) in ﬁgures 2 and 3. These results provide substantial evidence that teach-
ing experience improves reading test scores. Ten years of teaching experience is expected
to raise both Vocabulary and Reading Comprehension test scores by about 4 NCE points
or .2 standard deviations (ﬁgure 2). However, the path of these gains is quite diﬀerent
between the two subject areas. In line with the identifying assumption, the function for
Vocabulary scores exhibits positive and declining marginal returns, and gains approach zero
as experience approaches the cutoﬀ point.
Marginal returns to experience exhibit much slower declines for Reading Comprehension,
and suggest that my identiﬁcation assumption may be violated in this case.36 However,
if returns to experience were positive after the cutoﬀ, as it appears they might be, the
experience function I estimate would be biased downward, because estimated school-year
eﬀects would be biased to rise over time. Thus, these results may provide a conservative
estimate of the impact of teaching experience on Reading Comprehension test scores.
35F-tests of the joint signiﬁcance of school-year eﬀects show them to be important predictors of test scores
in all four subject areas.
36The hypothesis that gains are zero near the cutoﬀ cannot be rejected and the cubic term is negative,
but the functional form of f (Expjt) appears fairly linear.
15There is little evidence of gains from experience for the two math subjects (ﬁgure 3).
While the ﬁrst few years of teaching experience appear to raise scores signiﬁcantly in Math
Computation (about .1 standard deviations), subsequent years of experience appear to lower
test scores, though standard errors are too large to conclude anything deﬁnitive about these
trends. Math Concepts scores do not seem to be raised signiﬁcantly by teaching experience
at any point.
Estimates of experience eﬀects should not be aﬀected by any correlation between teachers’
ﬁxed eﬀects and their propensity to remain teaching in these districts. However, if teachers
who stay were selected based on their gains from experience, this identiﬁcation strategy
would lead to biased estimates of the expected experience eﬀects for all teachers. While
the direction of this potential bias is unclear, these estimates should be interpreted as the
expected gains from experience for teachers who stay in these districts.37
I check the sensitivity of these results to the set of identifying assumptions by comparing
them with estimates under two other sets of restrictions. In the ﬁrst case, I assume that
year eﬀects are zero and include grade eﬀects and school-grade interactions. This change in
speciﬁcation does not change the results except to increase the estimated impact of teaching
experience. In the second case, I assume that student ﬁxed characteristics are uncorrelated
with teacher assignment, so that student ﬁxed eﬀects can be omitted, and all interactions
between school, grade, and year can be included. This change produces larger estimated
impacts of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects and teaching experience than those presented above.
37Teachers who improve greatly may be more likely to remain if they have gained more ﬁrm-speciﬁco r
occupation-speciﬁc human capital, if the district administration is more likely to reappoint them, or if their
probability of eventually being oﬀered tenure has increased. On the other hand, if teachers tend to leave
after a particularly bad year, and the cause of that poor performance is not persistent, then there may be a
negative correlation between expected gains and the probability of staying.
164.1 Naïve Estimates of Experience Eﬀects
Previous studies have relied on variation across teachers to identify experience eﬀects, and
are susceptible to bias from correlation between experience levels and other teacher char-
acteristics that aﬀect student achievement. This type of correlation could arise for many
reasons: less eﬀective teachers may be less likely to get reappointed, more eﬀective teachers
may be more likely to move to higher paying occupations, teacher quality may diﬀer by
cohort, etc.
To view these correlations, ﬁgure 4 plots averages of the estimated teacher ﬁxed eﬀects by
years of experience, from zero to ten years. For ease of exposition, the average ﬁxed eﬀect
for teachers with no experience is normalized to zero. There is a clear negative relation
between teacher ﬁxed eﬀects and experience in the Vocabulary subject area, suggesting that
estimates of experience eﬀects that do not condition on teacher ﬁxed eﬀects would be much
smaller for this test. Trends in the other subject areas are less stark–a small negative
relation in Reading Comprehension and Math Concepts, and a small positive relation in
Math Computation.





Results for experience eﬀects that do not control for teacher ﬁxed eﬀects come from
estimation of equation 4, where f (Expjt) is a cubic and Exp is ten years.38 In lieu of
teacher ﬁxed eﬀects is a dummy for whether or not a teacher has a masters degree (Mj).
Students’ test scores are not signiﬁcantly higher on average with teachers who have masters
38In order to make these estimates comparable to those above, experience eﬀects are estimated only for
teachers with experience at or below the cutoﬀ. To implement this, I interact the cubic in experience with
a dummy for having ten or less years of experience, and include a dummy variable for having more than ten
years of experience.
17degrees, and on Reading Comprehension tests they are signiﬁcantly lower by about .02
standard deviations (see table 4).39
Figures 5 and 6 show the point estimates for experience eﬀects from this speciﬁcation.40
As predicted, estimated returns to experience are much lower for Vocabulary test scores.
They are also lower for Reading Comprehension and Math Concepts, and there is little ev-
idence of statistically signiﬁcant returns to experience in any test subject. As mentioned
above, there are many reasons why experience and ﬁxed teacher quality might be correlated,
and the correlations shown in ﬁgure 4 cannot be generalized to other school districts. How-
ever, these ﬁndings provide clear evidence that using variation in student performance across
teachers to measure gains from experience is likely to give misleading results.
4.2 Correlation of Teacher Quality Across Subjects
It is quite possible that a teacher is better at teaching one subject than another, and this
variation in skill might be important for policy decisions. For example, if the quality of
teachers’ mathematics instruction was inversely related to the quality of reading instruction,
then exchanging teachers between students would have an ambiguous eﬀect on student out-
comes, and having teachers specialize in teaching one subject might be more eﬃcient. I
brieﬂy examine this question by looking at the pairwise correlations between teachers’ ﬁxed
eﬀects across subjects, shown in table 5. There are positive correlations between all tests,
although correlations between Vocabulary and other subject areas are considerably smaller
(.16 to .32) than among the other three subject areas (.46 to .67). There is little indication
3940% of teachers in district A and 28% of teachers in district B have a masters degree.
40For ease of exposition 95% conﬁdence intervals for these estimates, and the point estimates with controls
for ﬁxed eﬀects are also shown.
18that teachers who are better at mathematics instruction are worse at reading instruction or
vice versa.41
Sampling error may bias measures of the correlation of teacher ﬁxed eﬀects across sub-
jects, but the direction of the bias is unclear ap r i o r i . Errors that are common across
subjects will lead to upward bias, and errors that are independent across subjects will lead
to downward bias. If the true correlation between subjects is the same for all teachers in this
sample, I can gain some insight into the direction of bias by recalculating the correlations
using only teachers observed with at least three classrooms, since sampling error is smaller
for this subsample. Pairwise correlations among this group of teachers are between .05 and
.1 higher in all subject areas, indicating that sampling error is likely to have biased down
t h ec o r r e l a t i o n ss h o w ni nt a b l e5 . 42
4.3 Variance Decomposition
To give an idea of the potential scope of teachers’ impact on the overall distribution of scores,
I estimate upper and lower bounds on the proportion of test score variance accounted for by
teacher ﬁxed eﬀects and experience eﬀects. This also serves to demonstrate the potential
41It is also possible that some teachers are better at teaching certain types of students than others. If
this were true, then there might be eﬃciency gains through active matching of students and teachers. In
contrast, if the ‘good’ teachers are equally good for everyone, then the matching of students and teachers
probably has more to do with equity than eﬃciency.
To examine this issue, I estimate quantile regressions at the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles. These
regressions are of the same form as that used to estimate equation 3, but do not include student ﬁxed eﬀects.
(Including student ﬁxed eﬀects requires too much computational power. Even without student ﬁxed eﬀects,
the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimators must be obtained via bootstrapping, and this can
take weeks.) I ﬁnd teacher ﬁxed eﬀects are signiﬁcant predictors of test scores in all of these regressions.
They are also positively correlated: correlation coeﬃcients between the 25th and 75th quantiles for the same
subject area range from .50 to .79.
42To truly correct for sampling error in these calculations, one would simultaneously estimate teacher eﬀects
on all four subject areas in a multiple equation regression framework, and locate the corresponding error
variance estimates in the variance-covariance matrix. Since the direction of bias is likely to be downward,
and these ﬁndings are only an extension to the main results above, I do not pursue this strategy.
19scope of policies targeted at improving teacher quality. However, my data come from only
two districts (and they are quite similar in many respects), so it would be naïve to draw
conclusions from these results about how variation in teacher quality across districts might
explain variation in achievement.
The upper bound estimate of the variance accounted for by teachers is the adjusted
R2 from a linear regression of test scores on teacher ﬁxed eﬀects and experience eﬀects.
The lower bound estimate is the increase in the adjusted R2 when teacher ﬁxed eﬀects and
experience eﬀects are added to a regression speciﬁcation that contains dummies for students
who are retained or repeat grades, student ﬁxed eﬀects, and school-year eﬀects.43 For
comparison, I also estimate lower and upper bounds in this same way for the school-year
eﬀects and the student level eﬀects (i.e., ﬁxed eﬀects and the controls for being retained and
repeating a grade). Table 6 shows these results. Across subject areas, the upper bound
estimates range from 5.0-6.4% for teacher eﬀects, 2.7-6.1% for school-year eﬀects, and 59-
68% for student ﬁxed eﬀects. The lower bound estimates range from 1.1-2.8% for teacher
eﬀects, .4% to 2.3% for school-year eﬀects, and 57-64% for student eﬀects.
The lower bound estimates of test score variance accounted for by teacher eﬀects may
seem small. However, when thinking about the role of policies, one should keep in mind
that explaining the total variance in test scores with policy-relevant factors is probably
impossible. Idiosyncratic factors and natural variation in cognitive ability among students
are surely beyond policymakers’ control. Moreover, policymakers often avoid intervention
in the home, and household factors may play a large role in determining test score outcomes.
43I omit classroom characteristics from this part of my analysis because they do not have signiﬁcant
predictive power for test scores.
20A better characterization may be to calculate the proportion of “policy-relevant” test
score variance accounted for by teachers. An estimate of policy-relevant variance can be
found by taking the fraction of test score variance due to measurement error—say .10—and
the lower bound estimate of the fraction of test score variance attributed to student-level
variables—.57 to .64—and subtracting their sum from 1.44 Using the estimates in table 6,
I ﬁnd diﬀerences among teachers explain proportions of policy-relevant test score variance
ranging from lower bounds of 4-9% to upper bounds of 16-23%.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that raising teacher quality may be a key instru-
ment in improving student outcomes. However, in an environment where many observable
teacher characteristics are not related to teacher quality, policies that focus on recruiting and
retaining teachers with particular credentials may be less eﬀective than policies that reward
teachers based on performance.
As measures of eﬀective teaching, test scores are widely available, objective, and (though
they may not capture all facets of what students learn in school) they are widely recognized as
important indicators of achievement by educators, policymakers, and the public. A number
of states have begun rewarding teachers with non-trivial bonuses based on the average test
performance of students in their schools, but few areas (Cincinnati, Denver) have pursued
44A tenth of variance due to measurement error is a standard and perhaps conservative estimate. Stan-
dardized test makers publish reliability coeﬃcients, which estimate the correlation of test-retest scores for
the same student, and these usually are about .9 or slightly below. One minus this reliability coeﬃcient is
equivalent to the percentage of variance due to idiosyncratic factors, or what we call measurement error for
simplicity. On the other hand, it is probably the case that some of the variance in test scores stemming
from cognitive ability and household factors can be aﬀected by education-based policy initiatives. For ex-
ample, special education programs may increase the average test score performance of students with learning
disabilities. Measuring the degree to which this is possible is clearly an extremely diﬃcult exercise, and
certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
21programs that link individual teacher salaries to their own students’ achievement. Recent
studies of pay-for-performance incentives for teachers in Israel (Lavy 2002a, Lavy 2002b)
indicate that both group- and individual-based incentives have positive eﬀects on students’
test scores, and that individual-based incentives may be more cost-eﬀective.
Teacher evaluations may also present a simple and potentially important indicator of
teacher quality. There is already substantial evidence that principals’ opinions of teacher
eﬀectiveness are highly correlated with student test scores (Murnane 1975, Armor et al.
1976), and while evaluations introduce an element of subjectivity, they may also reﬂect
valuable aspects of teaching other than improving test performance.
However, eﬀorts to improve the quality of public school teachers face some diﬃcult hur-
dles, the most daunting of which is the growing shortage of teachers. Hussar (1998) estimated
the demand for newly hired teachers between 1998 and 2008 at 2.4 million–a staggering ﬁg-
ure, given that there were only about 2.8 million teachers in the U.S. during the 1999-2000
school year.45 Underlying this prediction is the fact that the fraction of teachers nearing
retirement age has been growing steadily over the past two decades and continues to do so.
In 1978, 25.7% of elementary and secondary public school teachers were over the age of 45;
by 1998 that ﬁgure was 47.8%.
There is also evidence that the supply of highly skilled teachers has declined. A recent
study by Corcoran et al. (2002) shows that females with very high test scores who graduated
45Notably, this prediction does not take into account possible reductions in class size, which would con-
siderably increase the need for new teachers. Even if lowering class size has a signiﬁcant beneﬁcial eﬀect on
student achievement, it will certainly cause a temporary drop in average experience levels, and may lower
long run teacher quality if new teachers are of lower quality than current teachers. Moreover, the impact
of class size reduction may vary by district, since wealthy districts may ﬁll their increased demand for new
teachers with the highest quality teachers from poorer areas. Jepsen and Rivkin (2002) provide evidence
that this type of shifting in teacher quality took place after class size reduction legislation was enacted in
California.
22high school in the early 1980s were much less likely to enter teaching than those from earlier
cohorts. One reason for this change may be that the opportunities outside of teaching
for highly skilled females have improved. Indeed, the average income of female teachers,
relative to college-educated women in other professions, has declined substantially over this
time period.46 Although recent evidence indicates women who were once full-time teachers
usually do not leave the education profession for a job that pays more money (Scafadi et al.
2002), there may be many women (and men) who would make excellent teachers, but choose
not to teach for monetary reasons.
Given this set of circumstances, it is clear that much research is still needed on how high
quality teachers may be identiﬁed, recruited, and retained. Seeking out and compensating
teachers solely on the basis of education and experience (above the ﬁrst few years) is unlikely
to yield large increases in teacher quality, though currently this is common practice. Finding
alternative sources of information on teacher quality may be crucial to the creation of eﬀective
policies to raise student achievement.
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24A Tests for Systematic Classroom Assignment
To test for systematic diﬀerences in the groups of students assigned to particular teachers
(i.e., tracking), I test if current classrooms are signiﬁcant predictors of past test scores.
To do so, I calculate the residuals from a regression of past test scores on school-year-grade
dummies, regress these residuals on classroom dummies, and test the signiﬁcance of variation
in past test scores across classrooms using a joint F-test on these dummy variables. I only
look at variation within school-year-grade cells because administrators can only change the
classroom to which they assign students, not the school, year or grade. Table A.1 shows,
by district, the F-statistics and p-values for these tests in each of the four subject areas.
All of the p-values are close to one, substantiating administrators’ claims that there was no
systematic classroom assignment based on ability/achievement.
I also examine how students are mixed from year to year as they progress to higher
grades, i.e., if administrators tend to keep the same groups of students together for suc-
cessive years. This type of systematic classroom assignment would not be captured by
diﬀerences in past achievement across classrooms. I examine this issue through calculation
of dissimilarity indices, commonly used to measure spatial segregation (e.g. of racial groups
in neighborhoods within a city). One can see the intuition for using this measure by asking:
are students in a particular school-grade-year cell ‘segregated’ across current classrooms by
their previous classroom? If one considers a school-grade-year cell like a city, a classroom
like a neighborhood, and a student’s previous classroom like a racial group, the issues are
clearly parallel.
To indicate what dissimilarity indices would look like with random assignment, I generate
data where students from four ‘classrooms’ of 20 students each are randomly placed into
four new ‘classrooms’ of 20 students each–this is fairly representative of the school-year-
grade cells in my data. Dissimilarity indices from this monte carlo exercise are located
predominantly between .1 and .3. Figure A.1 shows, by district, the actual proportion of
school-grade-year dissimilarity indices falling between zero and .1, .1 and .2, etc. A large
majority of cells have indices between .1 and .3, giving strong evidence that the mixing of
classmates from year to year in these districts is similar to random assignment.47
47Though indices decrease with the number of students in each classroom and increase with the number of
classrooms, but large changes in the parameters I use (e.g., 100 students per classroom or 20 classrooms per
school-grade cell) are needed to radically change the results. Also, a tiny fraction of school-grade-year cells
in district B have indices above .6. This is driven by the small number of classrooms in district B that are
‘split-level’, i.e. they have students from adjacent grades placed in the same classroom. It is obvious when
looking at the data that many of the students placed in the lower grade of a split-level classroom remain
with that teacher the following year if that teacher is assigned a split-level classroom.
25Reading 
Vocabulary
Reading       
Comprehension
Math   
Computation
Math       
Concepts
Held Back -5.546 -5.569 -8.533 -8.060
(1.830)** (1.879)** (2.736)** (2.120)**
Repeating Grade 0.841 2.032 -4.296 -1.118
(1.853) (2.041) (2.147)* (1.926)
Class Size 0.045 -0.129 -0.081 0.099
(0.080) (0.078) (0.107) (0.077)
Classmates' Average Previous Test Score -0.004 0.023 0.051 -0.009
(0.032) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030)
Split-level Classroom 0.414 -0.715 -0.883 0.194
(0.735) (0.632) (0.805) (0.734)
Below Split in Split-level Classroom 0.139 -1.318 -0.098 -1.503
(0.765) (0.722) (0.843) (0.810)
Observations 17409 20506 18266 23289
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.85
Table 1: Estimated Effects of Student Characteristics and Classroom 
Characteristics on Test Scores
Test scores are expressed on a Normal Curve Equivalent scale; one standard deviation on this scale is 21 points.  All regressions 
include teacher and student fixed effects, a cubic in experience, and school-year effects.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
by pupil.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Reading 
Vocabulary
Reading       
Comprehension
Math   
Computation
Math       
Concepts
Held Back -6.323 -6.088 -9.508 -8.621
(1.858)** (1.854)** (2.437)** (1.993)**
Repeating Grade 0.969 2.062 -0.086 -1.117
(1.864) (1.989) (2.154) (1.826)
Class Size 0.046 -0.100 0.102 0.108
(0.068) (0.064) (0.077) (0.062)
Split-level Classroom 0.848 0.225 -0.496 0.124
(0.605) (0.536) (0.613) (0.597)
Below Split in Split-level Classroom -0.128 -1.364 0.084 -1.065
(0.687) (0.622)* (0.704) (0.699)
Observations 22335 26012 25006 29312
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.83
Table 2: Estimated Effects of Student Characteristics and Classroom 
Characteristics on Test Scores
Test scores are expressed on a Normal Curve Equivalent scale; one standard deviation on this scale is 21 points.  All regressions 
include teacher and student fixed effects, a cubic in experience, and school-year effects.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered by pupil.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%Reading 
Vocabulary




Math   
Concepts
Panel I:  Significance of Teacher Fixed Effects
†
F-statistic (P-Value)
Reading Vocabulary 2.82  (<0.001)
Reading Comprehension 2.07  (<0.001)
Math Computation 3.65  (<0.001)
Math Concepts 5.54  (<0.001)
10th 25th 75th 90th
Reading Vocabulary -5.59 -2.78 3.15 5.53
Reading Comprehension -4.48 -2.36 3.23 5.81
Math Computation -6.57 -3.56 3.19 7.93
Math Concepts -7.51 -3.35 3.19 6.01
† F-test is on the joint significance of teacher dummy variables to predict test scores in the linear regression.
Table 3: Significance and Magnitude of Teacher Fixed Effects
Regressions include controls for being held back or repeating a grade, class size, being in a split-level classroom and 
being in the lower half of a split-level classroom, student fixed effects, school-year effects, and experience effects.
†† Differences across teacher effects are given in terms of points on a Normal Curve Equivalent scale; one standard 
deviation on this scale is 21 points.








Math   
Concepts
Held Back -7.970 -6.978 -10.453 -9.708
(2.072)** (2.133)** (2.815)** (2.154)**
Repeating Grade -0.088 2.019 -1.355 -0.522
(1.936) (2.364) (2.541) (2.137)
Class Size -0.019 -0.051 0.025 0.085
(0.061) (0.056) (0.070) (0.055)
Split-level Classroom 0.712 0.425 -0.349 1.087
(0.501) (0.465) (0.521) (0.538)*
Below Split in Split-level Classroom -0.542 -1.772 0.114 -1.340
(0.620) (0.571)** (0.659) (0.661)*
Teacher Has Masters Degree -0.165 -0.475 -0.054 0.189
(0.247) (0.226)* (0.284) (0.233)
Observations 21780 25354 24460 28657
R-squared 0.82 0.81 0.77 0.81
Table 4: Omitting Teacher Fixed Effects from Test Score Regressions
Test scores are expressed on a Normal Curve Equivalent scale; one standard deviation on this scale is 21 points.  All 
regressions include teacher and student fixed effects, a cubic in experience, and school-year effects.  Standard errors (in 









Reading Comprehension 0.27 1.00
Math Computation 0.16 0.46 1.00
Math Concepts 0.32 0.58 0.67 1.00
Table 5: Correlation of Teacher Fixed Effect Estimates Across 
Subject Area Tests
Note: These are the pairwise correlations of teacher fixed effects across subjects.  The teacher fixed 
effects used to calculate these correlations are estimated in regressions of test scores that include 
controls for students who are retained or repeat a grade, class size, being in a split-level classroom and 
being in the lower half of a split-level classroom, student fixed effects, a cubic in experience, and 








Teacher Fixed Effects and Experience
Reading Vocabulary 0.050 0.018 0.690
Reading Comprehension 0.051 0.011 0.691
Mathematics Computation 0.052 0.028 0.619
Mathematics Concepts 0.064 0.025 0.700
School-Year Effects
Reading Vocabulary 0.034 0.009 0.699
Reading Comprehension 0.039 0.004 0.698
Mathematics Computation 0.027 0.015 0.632
Mathematics Concepts 0.061 0.023 0.703
Student-Level Effects
Reading Vocabulary 0.676 0.643 0.065
Reading Comprehension 0.683 0.641 0.061
Mathematics Computation 0.595 0.575 0.073
Mathematics Concepts 0.658 0.624 0.102
Notes: 1. Upper bound estimates are the adjusted R
2 from a regression of test scores on just the factor in question: 
school year effects, teacher dummy variables and a cubic in experience, or student fixed effects and controls for 
students who are retained or repeat a grade.
2. Lower bound estimates are the increase in adjusted R
2 from adding one of the sets of factors to a regression of 
test scores that included the other two sets of factors as controls.  The adjusted R
2 from this latter regression is the 
Base R























































Nationally Standardized Scale Math Concepts Math Computation Reading Comprehension VocabularyFigure 2: The Effect of Teacher Experience on Reading Achievement,
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Note: dotted lines are bounds 
of the 95% confidence interval.Figure 3: The Effect of Teacher Experience on Math Achievement,
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Reading Vocabulary Reading Comprehension Math Computation Math Concepts
Note: Estimates of teacher fixed effects are taken from regressions that include controls for students who are retained or repeat grades, class size, being in a split-level classroom and being in 
the lower half of a split-level classroom, student fixed effects, a cubic in experience, and school-year effects.Figure 5: Teacher Experience Effects on Reading Achievement,














































Without Fixed Effects With Fixed Effects















































Without Fixed Effects With Fixed Effects
Note: vertical lines show 
95% confidence intervals.Figure 6: Teacher Experience Effects on Math Achievement,














































Without Fixed Effects With Fixed Effects















































Without Fixed Effects With Fixed Effects
Note: vertical lines show 
95% confidence intervals.F-statistic P-value F-statistic P-value
Reading Vocabulary 0.74 1.00 0.88 0.97
Reading Comprehension 0.77 1.00 0.91 0.90
Math Computation 0.77 1.00 0.90 0.95
Math Concepts 0.74 1.00 0.94 0.85
District A District B
Table A.1: Statistical Tests for Tracking by District and Test
Notes:  F-tests are on the joint significance of classroom dummies to predict past test scores within 















































District A District B